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From a CVE to a detection: from the advisory to a rule that catches the attack

Published Aug 18, 2026 · 8 min read
Blue TeamDetecciónCVE

A critical CVE drops, you prioritize it (EPSS, KEV, your exposure) and patch what you can. But patching takes time, and meanwhile you need to know if you're being attacked through it. The problem: a CVE advisory describes what breaks, almost never how to detect it. Here's the method to close that gap.

The advisory has more clues than it seems

Before writing anything, extract four things from the CVE text:

A command injection in an appliance's HTTP API with RCE translates, almost by itself, into: suspicious request to the service port → the service process spawns sh/cmd → unexpected outbound connection.

From clues to concrete signals

Now map each clue to telemetry you already have:

An anomalous parent (a web server suddenly parenting cmd.exe) is usually a better signal than the exact exploit signature: payloads mutate, behavior less so.

🌉 To start fast: paste a CVE's id and description into the CVE → detection bridge and it suggests ports, event IDs, ATT&CK tactics and a Sigma rule skeleton. These are suggestions / a starting point, not a finished detection: complete it with the real indicators.

The Sigma skeleton, then to your SIEM

Sigma lets you write the rule once and convert it to KQL, SPL, Elastic or Wazuh. A typical skeleton for the case above:

Detection card · Sigma Tested on the bench

Web server spawning a shell

Problem
After exploiting remote code execution in an exposed service, the attacker usually opens a shell from the web server process itself.
Goal
Alert when httpd.exe creates cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Telemetry
Windows process creation: Sysmon event 1 or Security 4688.
Requirements
Sysmon with process events, or process creation auditing (4688). The Image and ParentImage fields are Sysmon's; in 4688 they are NewProcessName and ParentProcessName.
ATT&CK
T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1059.003 · Windows Command Shell
T1059.001 · PowerShell
Level
High
title: Possible exploitation of CVE-XXXX-YYYY (appliance RCE)
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\httpd.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
  condition: selection
level: high
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate admin scripts of the service itself
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1059.001

How it works. Inside selection, fields are combined with AND and the values of a list with OR: it fires when the parent ends in \httpd.exe and the child ends in \cmd.exe or \powershell.exe. The backslash avoids matching names such as xcmd.exe.

Matches · synthetic event
ParentImage: C:\Apache24\bin\httpd.exe
Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
CommandLine: cmd.exe /c whoami
Also matches
  • Apache opens powershell.exe.
  • The same paths in upper case.
No match · negative cases
  • Apache starts php-cgi.exe, the normal case.
  • Apache rotates its logs with rotatelogs.exe.
  • Someone opens cmd.exe from the desktop.
  • A program called xcmd.exe: the backslash keeps it out.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate admin scripts or CGI of the service itself that call the shell.

Limits

  • Apache on Windows only: IIS (w3wp.exe), Tomcat (java.exe) and other servers need their own parent.
  • It misses PowerShell 7 (pwsh.exe), other system binaries (certutil.exe, rundll32.exe) and a renamed binary.
  • An exploit that creates no process (a webshell that reads files) leaves no such signal.
Automated test: 3 positive and 4 negative synthetic cases, on every CI run. Reviewed: 23 October 2026. Test your variant on the bench →

Fill in the real ParentImage, tune the selection and document false positives. Before pushing it, measure it.

⚒️ Refine the skeleton in Sigma Forge (and export it to KQL/SPL/Lucene/EQL/Wazuh), and grade it with the detection linter so it doesn't drown you in false positives.

Don't forget the network signal

Many exploits show up better going out than coming in: the compromised appliance calling a new IP (Sysmon 3, or your firewall/proxy logs). Pair the host signal with the network one and you'll have a detection far more robust than any payload signature.

Checklist

Patching closes the door; detecting tells you who tried to get in while you were closing it. You need both.

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Sergio Belmonte Morales
Sergio Belmonte Morales
Cybersecurity Analyst · SOC · Sentinel/KQL specialist